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ABSTRACT:  This paper explores the emotional life of governmental power through the affec-
tive domains of confidence and respect in criminal justice, in the context of a climate of inse-
curities and uncertainties with existing modes of governance.  The paper problematises some of 
the key tenets of the governmentality thesis and questions its core assumptions about forms of 
rationality, processes of subjectivation and the conditions of possibility for ethical conduct.  It 
also prompts us to reconsider the tenets of contemporary neo-liberal governance, its 
‚rationalities of rule,‛ technologies and apparatuses, how these work to capture hearts as well as 
minds, and how these may promote an ‚emotionalised‛ art of government such that we might 
properly speak of ‚emotionalities of rule.‛    
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Introduction 
Studies in governmentality have opened up our understanding of how neo-liberal strategies of 
rule govern through the self-regulated, entrepreneurial, competitive choices of autonomous 
individuals who exercise economic, political and social rationality in the choices and decisions 
they make.  As Burchell puts it, ‚(g)overnment increasingly impinges upon individuals in their 
very individuality, in their practical relationships to themselves in the conduct of their lives; it 
concerns them at the very heart of themselves by making its rationality the condition of their active 
freedom.‛2 Throughout Foucaultian accounts of neo-liberalism we consistently encounter a 
citizenry of responsibilised subjects who self-integrate into a myriad of ‛calculative regimes,‛ 
                                                 
1 Earlier versions of aspects of this paper were presented at the Stockholm Criminology Symposium held at the 
University of Stockholm, 4-6 June 2007, paper entitled ‚Public confidence as an emotionality of rule;‛ and at 
the Fifth Social Theory Forum, held at the University of Massachusetts, 16-17 April 2008, paper entitled 
‚Powers of life and death in the governance of affect.‛  I am grateful to conference delegates for their con-
structive feedback and comments on the paper.  I am also indebted to the two anonymous reviewers for their 
very helpful and fulsome reviews of this article.  These have been invaluable to shaping the final version of the 
paper.    
2  Graham Burchell, ‚Liberal Government and Techniques of the Self‛ in Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, 
Neo-liberalism and Rationalities of Government, ed. Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), 30, Original emphasis. 
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subscribe to their own privatised forms of ‛risk-management‛ and adopt an ethics of 
‛utilitarianism‛ such that they maximise their lifestyles and then (mis)take these as a product of 
their own personal choice.  According to this description, it would seem that neo-liberal subjects 
have a purely instrumental relation to themselves and others; identifications with governmental 
technologies and practices, and obligations to align themselves with them, is represented as a 
purely cognitive affair.  I have no difficulty in accepting the view that the figure of a self-
actualising citizen is ‛the most fundamental, and most generalizable, characteristic of these new 
rationalities of government,‛3 but what is understated, and largely ignored in this perspective, is 
the possibility of a neo-liberal subject who is ‛actualised‛ by something other than (or as well as) 
governmental reason.  In short, the governmentality thesis appears to make little room for re-
sponsibilised individuals who may ‛decipher, recognize, and acknowledge themselves as 
subjects of desire,‛4 and whose affective selves, therefore, constitute a key site for the exercise of 
governmental power.   
This focus follows, and builds on Rose’s influential work on the genealogy of the self in 
which he expounds ‛the technologies and techniques that hold personhood – identity, selfhood, 
autonomy and individuality – in place.‛5  In this work, Rose acknowledges that desire, passions, 
sentiments and emotions are integral to such technologies, but he does not explicate this 
theoretically and provides no conceptual tools for understanding the governmental relations of 
affective life.  Similarly, and inspired by Spinozan philosophy,6 a range of scholarship7 has con-
solidated what Patricia Clough has identified as an ‛affective turn‛ in the humanities and social 
sciences.8  However, it is not until the collection of original essays edited by Clough and Halley 
that affect is theorized as having political potential within relations of power – a perspective 
which moves beyond Massumi’s supposition of affect as ‛pre-social.‛9  As the sub-title of the 
collection suggests, here is a series of papers which see the affective turn as necessary, if not 
central to ‛theorizing the social,‛ and which explore the affective life of, inter alia, organised sex 
                                                 
3 Nikolas Rose, ‚Governing ‘Advanced’ Liberal Democracies,‛ in Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne & Nikolas 
Rose (ed.), Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), 60. 
4 Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality Volume 2. Trans. by Robert Hurley (Har-
mondsworth: Penguin, 1984), 5. 
5 Nikolas Rose, Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, Power and Personhood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 2. 
6 Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, in Complete Works, ed. Edwin Curley (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 
Part 3.  Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza. Transl. by Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 
1990). 
7 See, for example, Eve Kosofsky Sedgewick & Adam Frank (eds.), Shame and Its Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins Reader 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995).  Michael Hardt, ‚Affective Labour,‛ Boundary 2, 26, 2 (1999): 89-
100.  Lauren Berlant, Intimacy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).  Brian Massumi, Parables of the Vir-
tual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002).  Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics 
of Emotion (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004). 
8 Michael Hardt, ‚Foreword: What Affects Are Good For,‛ in Patricia Ticineto Clough & Jean Halley (eds.), The 
Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), ix. 
9 For this argument, see Patricia Ticineto Clough, ‚Introduction,‛ in Patricia Ticineto Clough & Jean Halley 
(eds.), The Affective Turn, 2. 
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work, health care training, Korean diaspora, cinematic technologies and fashion modeling.  It is 
in this spirit that this paper uses the domain of criminal justice, security and crime control in an 
age of risk and uncertainty as a lens through which to investigate the emotional life of 
governmental power.     
In many respects, a focus on emotional life problematises some of the key tenets of the 
governmentality thesis and forces us to question some of its core assumptions about forms of 
rationality, processes of subjectivation and the conditions of possibility for ethical conduct.  It 
also prompts us to reconsider the tenets of contemporary neo-liberal governance, its 
‛rationalities of rule,‛ technologies and apparatuses, how these work to capture hearts as well as 
minds, and how these may promote an ‛emotionalised‛ art of government.  The discussion is 
divided into three parts.  The first explores forms of rationality and makes the case for thinking 
about the mutually sustaining relationship between cognition and affectivity, between the 
instrumental and expressive capacities of the subject of power.  The discussion moves on to 
consider processes of subjectivation, paying particular attention to the problematic of Foucault’s 
‛subject-less subject.‛  Using a framework based on the Deleuzian notion of ‛the fold,‛ the third 
part of the discussion sets out a case study exploring the affective domains of confidence and 
respect to suggest ways in which subjectivities of affect constitute a key site for the exercise of 
governmental power.  The case study centres on a period of intensified and highly mediated 
governmental concern for freedom, protection (from risk) and the minimisation of harm and 
threat from dangerous others.  Though it refers to a particularly eventful year in the United 
Kingdom, 2006, the case study explores a range of contemporary modes of government which 
are by no means exceptional, but are fairly typical of governmental mechanisms deployed in the 
name of security and which seek to reassure the public and restore confidence in, and respect for 
systems of governance.    
 
1. Forms of Rationality 
Foucault’s interest in rationality should not be confused with the Weberian conception and 
analysis of rationality as a global and historical process.  As Smart points out, for Weber, a 
process of rationalization had permeated all spheres of social life such that he proposed it as the 
principal defining feature of modernity.10  By contrast, and at times defending himself against 
the allegation that his work ‛boils down to one and the same meta-anthropological or meta-
historical process of rationalization,‛11 Foucault emphasises the contextuality and historical 
variability of different forms of rationality, their specific functions and effects.  Of all the forms, 
then, which ‛rationality‛ can take, a globalising, trans-historical and universal form is not 
amongst them.  Rather, ‛rationalities of rule‛ are specific ways of thinking about how to govern 
at particular times and places.  This is not a question of formulating and implementing some 
grand design distilled from political and philosophical analysis, or imposing a schema of 
governmental logic on an imperfect reality.  ‛Rationalities‛ are discursive; they propose stra-
tegies, suggest reforms, identify problems, recommend solutions and constitute a series of 
                                                 
10  Barry Smart, Michel Foucault (London: Routledge, 2004), 138. 
11 Michel Foucault, ‚Questions of Method,‛ in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon & Peter Miller (eds.), The 
Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 78. 
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suppositions, instructions and assumptions which are encapsulated in discourses and know-
ledges that guide, advise and inform our ways of being in the world.  As Rose reminds us, 
‛(t)hese rationalities< operate not so much to describe the world as to make it thinkable and 
practicable under a particular description.‛12  Lemke uses the phrase a ‛pragmatics of gui-
dance‛13 and goes on to assert that a political rationality is not some kind of pure, neutral 
knowledge, nor is it exterior to knowledge, but is an ‛element of government itself which helps 
to create a discursive field in which exercising power is ‚rational.‛‛14  Lemke’s use of quotation 
marks to indicate the ambiguity of ‛rational‛ is significant here.  He is drawing attention to 
Foucault’s rejection of any notion of an ideal, transcendental reason against which can be 
counterposed nonreason or irrationality.  Foucault describes such a comparative exercise as 
‛senseless‛15 and he compares corporal and carceral forms of penality to make the point: 
 
The ceremony of public torture isn’t in itself more irrational than imprisonment in a cell; but 
it’s irrational in terms of a type of penal practice which involves new ways of calculating its 
utility, justifying it, graduating it, etc<16 
 
Foucault’s refusal to evaluate systems of penality by a criterion of scientific rationality is typical 
of postmodern accounts that regard reason and logic ‛on the same footing‛ as myth and 
magic.17  However, Foucault’s typicality is short-lived and he parts company from postmodern 
perspectives on ‛rationality‛ by insisting that we should restrict our ‛use of this word to an 
instrumental and relative meaning.‛18 Though he repeats here the importance of context-
specificity, he nonetheless substitutes instrumentalism for ‛reason‛ as the yardstick of ‛ratio-
nality.‛  For those of a postmodernist persuasion, instrumental or purposive ways of ‛reaso-
ning‛ are especially objectionable since they emphasise utility, efficiency, reliability, durability, 
superiority, at the expense of expressive values and sentient forms of human existence.  Even 
modernist commentators complain that Foucault is ‛unduly instrumental and purposive;‛19 or 
worse, that he subscribes to a ‛dogmatic functionalism.‛20  
However, much of the evidence for these accusations centres on his theoretical work on 
disciplinary and bio-power, suggesting that while critique may be analytically persuasive, it is 
nonetheless specific to Foucault’s genealogical studies and is primarily relevant to his con-
temporary focus on disciplinary society, bio-politics, surveillance and panopticism.  Similarly, 
Foucault’s self-incriminating assertion of the utilitarian ethos of ‛rationalities‛ should not be 
overstated or taken as his only or last word on the matter.  It is debatable, for example, whether, 
                                                 
12 Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self (London: Free Association Books, 1999), xxii. 
13 Thomas Lemke, ‚Foucault, Governmentality and Critique,‛ Rethinking Marxism, 14, 3 (2002), 55. 
14 Ibid., 55. 
15 Michel Foucault, ‚Afterword: the Subject and Power‛ in Herbert L.  Dreyfus & Paul Rabinow (eds.), Michel 
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982), 210. 
16  Foucault, ‚Questions of Method,‛ 79. 
17  Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1988), 146-150. 
18  Foucault, ‚Questions of Method,‛ 79. 
19 David Garland, ‚Frameworks of Inquiry in the Sociology of Punishment,‛ British Journal of Sociology, 41, 1 
(1990), 3 
20  Ibid., 4. 
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in using the term ‛instrumental,‛ Foucault is referring to an ambitious schema of calculative, 
technocratic utility, or to something more modest, such as the ‛practical‛ or ‛do-able‛ qualities 
of governmental techniques, discourses and practices in their experiential immediacy – 
‛rationalities,‛ then, as a sort of everyday ‛how-to‛ or ‛know-how.‛  Such an interpretation 
does not, therefore, exclude a consideration of what we might usefully term ‛emotionalities of 
rule‛– that is, discursive and material forms which propose and suppose particular ways of 
feeling about the world.  We could suggest, then, that ‛rationalities of rule‛ is a more inclusive 
concept than has hitherto been suggested, and refers to all manner of governmental technologies 
and apparatuses that render practicable how to think, how to act, and how to feel.     
On purely nominal grounds, we might refer to processes that sustain the emotional life of 
governmental power as ‛emotionalities of rule.‛  This does not suggest their opposition to 
‛rationalities of rule,‛ but encourages an inclusive frame of reference that recognises the 
mutually sustaining relationship between the cognitive and instrumental, on the one hand, and 
the affective and the expressive, on the other.  Put another way, in order for neo-liberal subjects 
to think differently about the choices and decisions they can make, they may also need to learn to 
feel differently about them.   
 
2. Processes of Subjectivation 
Many scholars have been swift to point out how governmentality recognises the multi-
dimensionality of power relations, and suggest that the thesis overcomes much of what was 
regarded as Foucault’s one-dimensional focus on disciplinary power and forces of domination.21  
As Lemke puts it; the notion of governmentality has ‛innovative potential‛ in so far as it  
recognises how power is both an objectivizing and a subjectivizing force, bringing into view the 
idea of a constituted-constituting subject permanently positioned within the interstice of  indivi-
dualising power and individual freedom.22  McNay suggests that one of the key analytical 
advantages to Foucault’s concept of governmental power over that of disciplinary power is that 
it introduces the idea of an active subject who has the capacity to resist the ‛individualizing and 
totalizing forces of modern power structures.‛23 
Endowed with a capacity for resistance, a citizenry of (neo-)liberal subjects are capable, 
then, of transforming, subverting and challenging governmental relations of all kinds – from a 
refusal to commit to a healthy diet, to a failure to provide evidence as a witness of crime, 
through to a rejection of the need to recycle in the name of environmental protection.  Impli-
citly, then, resistance is configured as a matter of self-reflexive choice or personal motivation to 
opt out of, ignore or dissociate from particular technologies and practices.  This sits easily within 
a model of generative, autonomous agency, but is difficult to square with Foucault’s idea of 
subjectivation which denotes the dialectical nature of constraint and freedom – that ‛the subject 
is constituted through practices of subjection, or, in a more autonomous way, through practices 
                                                 
23 Lois McNay, Foucault: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994).  Paul Patton, ‚Foucault’s Sub-
ject of Power,‛ in Jeremy Moss (ed.), The Later Foucault (London: Sage, 1998). 
22 Thomas Lemke, ‚’The Birth of Bio-Politics’: Michel Foucault’s Lecture at the Collège de France on Neo-
Liberal Governmentality,‛ Economy and Society, 30, 2 (2001), 191. 
23  McNay, Foucault: A Critical Introduction, 123. 
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of liberation, of liberty.‛24  McNay complains that Foucault fails to offer a satisfactory account of 
agency and that he vacillates ‛between moments of determinism and voluntarism.‛25  Butler is 
critical of the term ‛subjectivation,‛ seeing it as paradoxical in so far as it ‛denotes both the 
becoming of the subject and the process of subjection – one inhabits the figure of autonomy only 
by becoming subjected to a power, a subjection which implies a radical dependency.‛26  Tie 
points out that Foucault’s constructed subject stands in a difficult relationship to itself in as far 
as the reflexive self is unable to ‛strike a radically resistive, critical distance from the terms of its 
construction.‛27 
Foucault’s failure to provide an account of agency makes it difficult, then, to distinguish 
practices of the self that are imposed on individuals through governmental sanctions and 
regulatory norms, from those which express relations of resistance.  Equally there is no basis for 
understanding the nature of compliance – whether it is the consequence of self-reflexivity, or the 
realisation of a (perverse) attachment to subjection.  In a mixed economy of power relations 
wherein ‛individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which 
several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may be realized,‛28 
processes of subjectivation can never be linear or homogenous.  Consequently, Tie argues, the 
cumulative effects of this heterogeneity cannot be predicted, and in the absence of a 
hermeneutics of selfhood and agency, the ‛possibilities for resistive action will always emerge 
accidentally‛29 rather than through a reflexive and critical process of self-realisation.    
The problematic of Foucault’s ‛subject-less subject‛ continues to haunt his analytics of 
power and has generated a subsidiary scholarship that, in various ways, attempts to theorise 
governmental subjectivities.  Psychoanalytical approaches feature prominently in this work and 
the contributions of Žižek, Butler and (the application of) Lacan, Klein and Freud to 
understanding the psychic dimensions of the constituted-constituting subject is of particular 
relevance.  In an eloquent and perceptive article, Tie discusses the relative merits of these per-
spectives suggesting that ‛subjects‛ complicity in their subjectivation cannot be understood as 
being purely the effect of their positioning in discourse.  Rather, their complicity has an ‚affective 
dimension.‛30  Of interest here is how that ‛affective dimension‛ is conceptualised within these 
particular psychoanalytical theories, and how it is mobilised as an exercise of power.  Žižek, for 
example, talks of an ‛unconscious supplement,‛ and posits a kind of sub-terranean reservoir of 
feeling which exists as Other to sovereign power, and which ‛provides enjoyment which serves 
                                                 
24 Michel Foucault, ‚An Aesthetics of Existence‛ in Foucault Live. Transl. by John Johnston. Ed. Sylvère 
Lotringer (New York: Semiotext(e), 1989), 313. 
25 Lois McNay, Gender and Agency: Reconfiguring the Subject in Feminist and Social Theory (Oxford: Polity Press, 
2000), 9. 
26 Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 
83. 
27  Warwick Tie, ‚The Psychic Life of Governmentality,‛ Culture, Theory and Critique, 45, 2 (2004), 164. 
28  Foucault, ‚Afterword: the Subject and Power,‛ 221. 
29  Tie, 165. 
30  Ibid., 161, Emphasis added. 
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as the unacknowledged support of meaning.‛31  However, it is debatable how far (or whether) 
Žižek’s thesis adequately addresses the question of agency, but this is of less concern here than 
his formulation of an ‛unconscious supplement.‛  It is not clear, for example, why ‛economies 
of pleasure‛ are regarded as ‛extra-discursive,‛ and therefore positioned in a pre-linguistic 
realm of the unconscious.  This would seem to support an essentialist position that posits the 
notion of a pre-social, biological and ‛extra-conscious‛ realm of emotionality.   
Meanwhile, for Butler, the ‛self-realisation‛ of the constituting subject occurs in a mo-
ment of trauma induced by a continual inability to constitute the self as a coherent and complete 
entity.  Butler posits the endless need to reiterate ‛who we are‛ as demonstrative of the inco-
herence of selfhood, a state of affairs which emerges from an unruly residue of psychic life 
‛which exceeds the imprisoning effects of the discursive demand to inhabit a coherent identity, 
to become a coherent subject.‛32  The psychic in Butler circulates in zones of un-intelligibility, is 
surplus to the requirements for subject-hood and is disruptive to it.  This is a pretty familiar 
psychoanalytic account of resistance.  For example, in Rose,33 the disruptive potential of the 
psyche is read through the Lacanian lens of an ‛alienating destiny‛ wherein the subject is 
rendered permanently unstable through the constitutive loss of (the possibility of) self-
identification.  In Jefferson,34 the ambivalence of Mike Tyson’s selfhood (as convicted rapist, as 
superstar boxer, as hypermasculine superstud, as ‛juvenile delinquent,‛ and as ‛little fairy 
boy‛) is understood through the Kleinian notion of an anxiety-reducing, psychical defence-
mechanism.  Tie invokes the Freudian motif of ‛the uncanny‛ as a ‛special shade of anxiety‛35 
which arises from ‛a return of unresolved psychic dilemmas‛36 – such as the realisation that 
what had seemed familiar (a sense of self, for example) turns out to be disturbingly and, 
perhaps, pleasurably strange.  Similarly, Butler has applied Freud’s concept of melancholia to 
understand the trauma of the impossibility of coherent subject formation; as she puts it, ‛the 
melancholia that grounds the subject (and hence always threatens to unsettle and disrupt that 
ground) signals an incomplete and irresolvable grief.‛37  
In each account, subjects’ resistance is located in an affective dimension of psychic life – 
alienation, anxiety, uncanniness and melancholia.  As such, it is not clear how these various 
psychic (or emotional) states reformulate or subvert the conditions of subjection, or redirect the 
discursive and material effects of power, so much as remain in a state of permanent power-
lessness at the margins of subject formation.  And what are we to make of a psychic life that is 
                                                 
31 Slavoj Žižek, The Mestases of Enjoyment: Six Essays on Woman and Causality (London: Verso, 1994), 56-57, cited 
in Tie, 162, Emphasis added. 
32  Butler, 86. 
33  Jacqueline Rose, Sexuality in the Field of Vision (London: Verso, 1987). 
34 Tony Jefferson, ‚From ‘Little Fairy Boy’ to the ‘Compleat Destroyer’: Subjectivity and Transformation in the 
Biography of Mike Tyson,‛ in Mairtin Mac An Ghaill (ed.), Understanding Masculinities (Buckingham: Open 
University Press, 1996), and Tony Jefferson, ‚The Tyson Rape Trial: The Law, Feminism and Emotional 
‘Truth,’‛ Social and Legal Studies, 6, 2 (1997), 281-301. 
35 Anneleen Masschelein, ‚The Concept as Ghost: Conceptualization of the Uncanny in Late Twentieth Century 
Theory,‛ Mosaic, 35, 1 (2002), 54 cited in Tie, 170. 
36 Tie, 170. 
37 Butler, 23. 
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energised by such a limited repertoire of emotions? ‛Good humours‛ such as delight, 
excitement, satisfaction and optimism do not feature in a psychoanalytic register of affects; yet 
there are no grounds to suppose that any emotional state – apart from apathy, perhaps – cannot 
be experienced as excess.  Citing de Beauvoir,38 McNay notes, ‛the language of psychoanalysis 
suggests that the drama of the individual unfolds only within the self and this obscures the 
extent to which the individual’s life and actions involve primarily a ‛relation to the world.‛‛39  
There is clearly merit in drawing attention to the libidinal, kinetic energy of psychic life as a 
destabilising force, but without an account of intersubjective relations, in which power is always 
implicated, it induces/incites neither complicity nor resistance within processes of subjectivation.   
A significant route out of this impasse is found within the Deleuzian notion of ‛the fold.‛  
Deleuze invents this metaphor to denote a ‛zone of subjectivation,‛40 adding that ‛subjectivation 
is created by folding.‛41 ‛The fold‛ does not presume a self with any essential interiority; nor is 
it the effect of an exterior field of power relations; it is, rather ‛a threshold, a door, a becoming 
between two multiplicities.‛42  The notion of ‛the fold,‛ then, not only rejects psychoanalytical 
suppositions of an interiorised psyche, but also addresses (and overcomes) the paradox of Fou-
cault’s constituted-constituting subject.43  As far as Deleuze is concerned ‛self-realisation‛ has 
nothing to do with a psychic residue or unconscious excess, neither is it the effect of the limits 
and exclusions of individualising practices; he argues: 
 
There never ‚remains‛ anything of the subject, since he (sic) is to be created on each 
occasion, like a focal point of resistance, on the basis of the folds which subjectivize 
knowledge and bend each power<  The struggle for subjectivity presents itself, therefore, 
as the right to difference, variation and metamorphosis.‛44   
 
Deleuze’s thesis of enfolding has been taken up by a number of governmentality theorists, most 
notably Dean, whose essay stands, perhaps, as the clearest exemplar of Deleuzian-Foucauldian 
eclecticism on matters of government.45  Dean undertakes what he refers to as a ‛critical 
ontology of our selves‛ to explore how modes of ‛governmental authority,‛ and ‛rationalities of 
rule‛ are doubled or enfolded into our ways of being, thinking and doing – ‛(i)n this sense,‛ he 
                                                 
38  Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), 80. 
39  McNay, Gender and Agency, 129. 
40 Gilles Deleuze, ‚Foldings, or the Inside of Thought (Subjectivation),‛ in Michael Kelly (ed.), Critique and 
Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate (Cambridge: MIT, 1995), 337 Diagram. 
41  Ibid., 323. 
42 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Transl. by Robert Hurley, Mark 
Seem & Helen R.  Lane (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 29. 
43 In ‚Afterword: The Subject and Power‛, Foucault talks of struggles against the ‘government of 
individuation’ which ties an individual to ‘his own identity in a constraining way’ (Ibid., 212.)  However, he 
leaves us with no analytical tools to think through how, in these ‘moments of struggle,’ we can overcome the 
submission of subjectivity. 
44  Deleuze, 325. 
45 See, for example, Nikolas Rose, ‚Government, Authority and Expertise in Advanced Liberalism,‛ Economy 
and Society, 22, 3 (1993), 283-299, and Nikolas Rose, ‚Authority and the Genealogy of Subjectivity,‛ in Paul 
Heelas, Scott Lash & Paul Morris (eds.), De-Traditionalization: Authority and Self in an Age of Cultural Uncertainty 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1995). 
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writes, ‛one might speak of a folding of exterior relations of authority to sculpt a domain that 
can act on and of itself but which, at the same time, is simply the inside marked out by that 
folding.‛46  As valuable as this work is for thinking about processes of subjectivation as the ‛en-
folding of authority,‛ it rests on a somewhat selective and partial reading of Deleuze, one which 
has the effect of obscuring from view the enfolding of ‛emotionalities of rule.‛  It is a surprising 
oversight given that most commentators acknowledge the complementarity of Foucault’s 
machinic theory of power, and Deleuze’s and Guattari’s machinic theory of desire.47  In Deleuze 
and Guattari, desire is regarded as the productive motor force of social relations.  In Anti-
Oedipus, they assert: 
 
We maintain that the social field is immediately invested by desire, that it is the historically 
determined product of desire, and that libido has no need of any mediation or sublimation, 
any psychic operation, any transformation, in order to invade and invest the productive 
forces and the relations of production.  There is only desire and the social, and nothing 
else.48 
 
From within this schema, affects are conceptualised as forces of desire, continuously flowing as 
‛intensities of movement, rhythm, gesture and energy.‛49 Affects follow ‛lines of flight,‛ esca-
ping ‛planes of consistency,‛ such as centred subjectivity and habitual routines, moving in 
unpredictable directions as a deterritorialising and productive wave of libidinal energy.  As 
Patton summarises, ‛the feeling of power is an affect which is associated with a process of 
becoming-other than what one was before.‛50 
It is this notion of ‛becoming-other‛ as an ‛enfolding‛ of ‛emotionalities of rule‛ that I 
want to unpack in the remainder of this paper.51  Based on Foucault’s original framework set out 
in The Use of Pleasure,52 Deleuze outlines ‛four folds of subjectivation;‛53 this frame of reference 
has been applied to great effect by Dean54 to elaborate the ‛enfolding of authority,‛ and it is 
being used here to structure and inform an exploration of the ‛enfolding of emotionality‛ using 
the affective domains of confidence and respect as a case study.  The analysis develops four key 
aspects for thinking about the ‛emotional self‛ as a problem of government; this involves, as 
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48  Deleuze and Guattari, 29. 
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Dean puts it, posing ‛questions of asceetics (the governing work)< ones of ontology (the 
governed material), deontology (the governable subject) and teleology (the telos of government).‛55    
 
 
3. Protecting Our Freedom 
 
For me, building a foundation of security, public order and stability is the basis for the trust 
and confidence which individuals, families and communities need to fulfil their potential.  
We can only drive lasting and sustained change by empowering people to take greater 
responsibility for the strength and well-being of their own lives and communities in a way 
that establishes a different relationship between Government and the governed.56 
 
In this foreword, the then Home Secretary, David Blunkett, neatly articulates the normative 
conditions for neo-liberal subjects to fulfil their potential – security, public order, stability, 
empowerment and responsibility for self and community.  What appears to be ‛different‛ about 
the governmental relationships iterated here is the emphasis placed on their anchorage in an 
affective relationship of trust and confidence.  It is nothing new for liberal democratic societies 
to value, if not sanctify such affectivities as necessary conditions of governmental legitimacy, 
authority and consent, most especially in terms of the political institutions which embody, 
uphold and protect the rule of law.  However, in this document and elsewhere in speeches, 
launches, press conferences, media interviews, consultation papers and policy statements, it is 
the absence of trust and confidence and the presence of fear, insecurity and uncertainty, which is 
routinely foregrounded as a problem of government.     
 
A telos of negative freedom 
In a speech to DEMOS in 2006, the Home Secretary (now John Reid) proclaimed that ‛we now 
live in a world where insecurity is a phenomenon that crosses the economic and the social, the 
domestic and the foreign, the psychological and physical, the individual and the collective.‛57  
Such assertions reinforce Giddens’ somewhat overworked notion of ‛ontological insecurity‛58 as 
a general descriptor of our common experience in late modernity.  While there is much to 
support this gloomy outlook, the rhetoric of a runaway world and its accompanying narratives 
of disembeddedness, suspicion, precariousness, risk, threat and fear, serves as an ‛organising 
disposition,‛ an ‛affective register‛ or an ‛emotionality of rule‛ for re-imagining the kind of 
government which can be fashioned in the name of freedom.  When the boundaries of the state 
of nature and the state of civil society are blurred, a self-interested citizenry will not only be 
receptive to emphatic (and oft-repeated) banner headlines, such as ‛Our citizens should not live 
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in fear;‛59 but they will also be open to governmental techniques and modalities which promise 
to realise the utopian telos of order, safety and stability.  Such an eventuality is made possible by 
a negative formula of freedom grounded in an ontology of (self-) protection.  As Blair put it:  
 
...this is not a debate between those who value liberty and those who do not.  It is an 
argument about the types of liberties that need to be protected...  and it is an attempt to 
protect the most fundamental liberty of all – freedom from harm by others.60   
 
This begs a number of questions, not least the matter of who are ‛the others‛ from whom we 
must be protected, and what kinds of harms can ‛these others‛ inflict which inhibit and threaten 
our freedom to govern ourselves and be governed as confident and secure individuals.  I want 
to suggest that an oppositional relation between self and ‛harmful others‛ is currently, and 
primarily mobilised through the inculcation of certain affective states of being in the world; 
these, in turn, encourage a receptivity to alternative governmental realities and forms of (self-) 
government – an ontology which Bennett theorises as ‛a mood with ethical potential.‛61   
 
More or less government? 
In the late spring of 2006, the UK experienced what might best be described as an emotional 
rollercoaster of existential angst.62  Scandals, crises, fiascos, incompetencies, controversial sen-
tencing, murders, abductions, rapes, ministerial sackings, prison abscondings, clandestine em-
ployment and a call from the former Chief Inspector of Prisons, Lord Ramsbotham, for the 
Prime Minister to ‛shut up,‛63 created the conditions for a very public, and highly mediated 
debate on the scope and ambition of government, and its ability to meet ‛its core purpose of 
protecting the public.‛64 
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In the United Kingdom in 2006, over the course of a few months, there was scarcely a 
governmental constituency which did not in some way constitute a ‛harmful other.‛  Amongst 
these, the usual suspects of terrorists, criminals and the ‛permanently delinquent‛65 did not so 
much loom large as form a backdrop of prevailing terror, suspicion, fear and intimidation upon 
which a range of different emotions came to be refracted.  The passions stirred by the ‛most 
harmful‛ are nothing new and form the kernel of primordial affectivities that sustain the need 
for government of any kind.  What was novel about 2006 was how a series of ‛unfortunate 
events‛ triggered a range of emotional dispositions that called into question what it means to 
govern and be governed; and as the year progressed, different emotional harms not only 
exposed the self as vulnerable, unprotected and ontologically precarious, but also came to 
invest, inspire and produce an affective formation of uncertainty.  In April 2006, the ‛foreign 
prisoners scandal‛ focused attention on the Home Office; whether it and the Home Secretary 
were ‛fit for purpose‛ was a question which persisted long after Charles Clarke’s dismissal in 
the following month, and continued under the incoming stewardship of John Reid.  The scandal 
centred on the revelation that an estimated 1,023 foreign prisoners had been released from 
prison between 1999 and March 2006 and had not subsequently been deported.  It further 
emerged that there was an unknown number of serious offenders (murderers and rapists) 
among those released, but the actual number was never determined and was variably reported 
as anything from 5 to 179.66  Perhaps the most honest report came from David Roberts at the 
Immigration and Nationality Directorate who admitted that he had not got the ‛faintest idea‛ as 
to how many illegal immigrants there were in the United Kingdom.  Later that same week, 
attention turned to the revelation that more than twenty convicted murderers had absconded 
from Leyhill Open Prison in the past five years; but this figure was to be quickly revised 
upwards following a BBC investigation which found that more than three hundred inmates had 
absconded from the prison in the previous three years.67  In the meantime, the head of the Prison 
Service, Phil Wheatley, was compiling his own statistics, and two days later admitted that 
around seven hundred prisoners had absconded from the open prison estate in the previous 
year alone.68  Not to be excluded from what was rapidly becoming a spectator sport, the 
spotlight belatedly fell on the Criminal Records Bureau when it made public that 2,700 
‛innocent people‛ had been wrongly screened as having criminal records, with some being 
turned down for jobs as a result.69  It was little wonder that as this catalogue of errors began to 
unfold, the Prime Minister ‛stumbled over answers when he gave them, and his mood appeared 
something between depressed and fed up.  The authoritative, commanding, dismissive Blair 
was nowhere to be seen.‛70  3,822 comments were contributed to the online discussion, Should 
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Charles Clarke Resign?71 with ‛shocking,‛ scandalous,‛ ‛sickening,‛ ‛dismayed,‛ ‛annoying‛ and 
‛stunned‛ featuring prominently as emotional harms caused by the saga of Home Office and 
ministerial blunders.    
If the ‛foreign prisoners scandal‛ and its aftermath had not already shaken confidence in 
the capacity of the state to protect the public, further revelations continued to expose the 
fragility of government in uncertain times.  A series of high-profile murders which culminated 
in court trials and sentencing in the spring of 2006, raised serious concerns about the 
effectiveness of offender management within the community.  For example, on November 2005, 
Mary-Ann Leneghan was kidnapped, raped, tortured and murdered by six youths, four of 
whom were under the supervision of the Probation Service at the time.  Quite predictably, and 
responding to a wave of public criticism and negative press coverage, the incoming Home 
Secretary, John Reid, was swift to pledge a review and overhaul of the Probation Service 
admitting that there were ‛shortcomings< to be frank, the probation system is not working as 
well as it should.‛72 By the end of the year, the Home Office had published figures which 
confirmed that more than five hundred serious, violent and sexual offences (including rape), 
and ninety-eight murders had been committed by offenders under probation supervision in the 
previous two years (The Scotsman, December 6, 2006).  Even though the politicians restated the 
issue as one of organisational and operational failures that could be addressed by reform, a 
bystanding public grew ever anxious but in a much more diffuse sense.  In desperation, a 
contributor to the online discussion, Do we need a Probation Service review? pleaded ‛for God’s 
sake protect us!‛73  In the same discussion, Ian from Whitwick asked: 
 
How many more innocent people have to be murdered before the public are protected.  I 
am really so angry that the Courts, Police and Probation services have failed to achieve their 
prime directive: TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC FROM DANGEROUS PEOPLE! (sorry for 
shouting).  (Uppercase in original).74 
 
From this perspective, which was shared by many other discussants, the failures of one 
statutory service was taken as symptomatic of a wider malaise of institutional government that 
was rapidly losing its protective appeal.  In an article which was cautious of punitive remedies 
and sceptical of the ‛good sense‛ of organisational overhaul, Mary Riddell argued of the Mary-
Ann Leneghan case, that: 
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The Probation Service is the wrong target here.  If Michael Johnson and his five co-torturers 
were really all ‚psychopaths‛ that would not be so frightening.  Johnson himself sounds a 
particularly brutal character.  But some of his gang sound chillingly normal – young men 
who tangled with drugs and relatively minor offences before somehow bonding together to 
form a death squad.75 
 
Here, Riddell hints at the collapse of the binary which separates ‛Us‛ and ‛Them,‛ the ‛normal‛ 
and the ‛pathological,‛ the ‛fearful‛ and the ‛feared.‛  Such a collapse evokes a Gothic sen-
sibility, triggering emotional displacements about our being in the world and amplifying deep-
seated concerns and anxieties associated with a specific socio-political and historical moment.  In 
short, things are never quite what they seem.76  A different kind of expressive logic was articu-
lated in the online discussion.   Nick from Warwickshire, UK wrote: 
 
The most frightening thing about the gang that killed that teenager is that they didn’t care; 
care about abducting the girls, care about torturing and raping them, care about killing 
them, care about being caught or care about going to prison.  How are we going to deal 
with individuals like this is anyone’s guess.  We have a whole generation coming up that 
doesn’t give a second thought about using extreme violence as a daily event.77 
 
For Nick, the greatest fear was the apparent loss of an ethics of care and the absence of 
mutuality; in prospect was the advent of a Hobbesian state of nature, and a future which was in 
the hands of a generation that, having already normalised violence, were sounding the death 
knell for sociality.   
Even without a prevailing meta-narrative of insecurity, these several events conspire to 
further undermine trust and confidence in the capacity of governmental authorities, techniques 
and forms of expertise to police the boundary between order and chaos leaving the self exposed, 
vulnerable and seeking its own protection.  Mead suggests that when the conditions for stability 
and certainty are not met, people will gravitate to more authoritarian forms of government – he 
notes that ‛(p)eople are not interested in ‛freedom‛ if they are<  in any fundamental way 
insecure.  They will want more government not less.‛78  This view may account for the emer-
gence of an ‛authoritarian liberalism‛79 and the ‛ratcheting up (of) one of the undisputed core 
functions of government – the maintenance of order and security – creating more and more 
efficient police, and promoting more punishments.‛80  It also goes some way to accounting for 
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the advent of the ‛new punitiveness‛ driven by a virulent ‛punitive populism‛ and its 
concomitant clamour for retributive, incapacitative and deterrent forms of justice.81  The puni-
tivity/authoritarian thesis has a certain prima facie appeal, but in much the same way as Žižek’s 
notion of the ‛unconscious supplement‛ it rests on some dubious and contradictory assump-
tions about both the strength and direction of the relationship between ‛structures of feeling‛ 
and authoritarian forms of rule.82  Moreover, and again following Žižek, it tends to regard 
‛collective sentiments‛ as the expression of a monolithic public in a universally punitive mood.  
Put another way, ‛punitive passions‛ do not exhaust the range of sensibilities that an affectivity 
of insecurity and uncertainty might involve – for example, feelings of disappointment, 
frustration, bewilderment, sorrow, despair, anger, shock, insult and confusion all feature in the 
public discourse detailed above.  Consequently, we would need to ask how an ontology of 
confidence and trust in the work of government – especially its sovereign and disciplinary forms 
– is conjured out of an aesthetic of these negative dispositions; how is a state of confidence 
rendered technical, governmental and political and what kinds of ethical commitments are 
inspired by it; what are the techniques of self-government which enfold insecure subjectivities 
and reproduce them as confident, assured citizens? 
 
Authoritarian and other selves 
Whenever attention is paid to the authoritarian orientations of liberal democratic societies, there 
is a tendency within criminology to focus exclusively on statutory institutions and those mea-
sures which rely on the exercise of sovereign and disciplinary power – such as harsher, deterrent 
sentencing; high visibility and targeted policing; greater use of surveillance technologies; 
intensification of juridical powers.  This limited focus results in a void in our understanding of 
what it means to govern the ‛authoritarian self‛ in a context of insecurity and disorder.  
Nonetheless, there are important expositions of the form, means, function and content of 
‛authoritarian techniques of the self‛ to be found in the wider sociological literature.  I am 
thinking here of Hindess’ essay on the notion of ‛(self-)improvement‛ and its centrality to what 
he describes as ‛the liberal government of unfreedom;‛83 and Valverde’s innovative work on the 
notion of ‛habit‛ and its role as a key technique for different forms of self-despotism.84  In each 
of these accounts, practices of self-government are always-already embedded within the 
‛common obligations of citizenship‛85 such that by working through a programme of self-
improvement, or resolving to rid oneself of ‛bad habits‛ expresses a social and political 
relationship and an ethical commitment to others.    
Dean talks of the formation of citizen-subjects as concerning a ‛‛mode of subjectification‛ 
or ‚mode of obligation‛< the position we take or are given in relation to rules and norms< 
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why we govern ourselves or others in a particular manner.‛86  Though I agree with Dean’s 
analysis, deontological questions do not solely involve normative ways of thinking, being and 
doing; this overlooks the transformative potential of affective modes, and how particular ways of 
feeling are implicated in practices of the self, in the production of self-alterity, of becoming-other, 
of feeling otherwise in order to be otherwise.    
In September 2005, the UK government set up a Respect Task Force, appointing both a 
Government Co-ordinator (Louise Casey) and a Minister for Respect (Hazel Blears) to oversee 
its progress.  Committing £80 million of new funding to the programme, in January 2006, the 
Prime Minister published a Respect Action Plan and by the end of October 2006, the Respect 
agenda had established its own Respect Squad and set up its own web-site and action hotline.  
With its nifty logo and catchy sound bites, the roll-out of the Respect programme was well 
underway before, during and after the spring scandals had left the UK citizenry reeling in 
despair for its own protection.  Accompanied by a good deal of trumpet-blowing, the pro-
gramme promised to deliver an affective mode of obligation which would enhance ethicality, 
mutuality and sociality.  In the launch speech for the Respect Action Plan, Blair announced: 
 
Respect is a way of describing the very possibility of life in a community.  It is about the 
consideration that others are due.   It is about the duty I have to respect the rights that you 
hold dear.  And vice-versa.  It is about our reciprocal belonging to a society, the covenant 
that we have with one another.87  
 
To earn respect, feel respect, be respectable, act respectfully is, then, expressive of an affirmative 
ethical affiliation, and for Blair, is an affective disposition held by the majority of people.  For 
example, in the launch speech, he comments, ‛(o)f course, the overwhelming majority of people 
understand this intuitively and have no trouble living side by side with their neighbour;‛88 and 
in the foreword of the Respect Action Plan, he notes that ”(m)ost of us learn respect from our 
parents and our families.‛89  It is this reference to ‛the majority‛ – those who are capable of self-
government as respectable citizens  – juxtaposed with ‛the minority‛ – those who have limited 
or no capacity for living an ethical life based on respect for others – which is of particular 
interest here.  As Dean reminds us, in liberal democratic societies, those who do not, cannot or 
will not form themselves as subjects of government are eligible for authoritarian techniques of 
rule.90  Thus, the Respect Action Plan makes it crystal clear that ‛(e)veryone can change – if 
people who need help will not take it, we will make them.‛91 
What seems to be proposed here is a cartography of un/governable subjects.  With the 
assurance that those who lack respect are to be subjects of and subjected to authoritarian 
technologies of rule, the ‛rest of us‛ can be (more) confident of living in a stable, ordered and 
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certain society.  To realise this telos, rather than rely on ‛deep-end‛ authoritarian measures  as 
conventionally conceived in articulations of ‛more government,‛ sovereign and disciplinary 
forms of government are to be put to work in, by and for the community.  In other words, in a 
process of responsibilisation,92 civil society forms the key locus for the deployment of a range of 
affective technologies for constituting subjectivities of both confidence and respect, displacing 
(though not replacing) the need for overt practices of ‛crime control‛ in favour of a series of 
networks of obligation and alliances of mutuality.   
 
Arts of the emotional self 
The Respect programme assumes the existence of a ‛respectable majority‛ who, despite their 
own capacity to self-govern, need to work on themselves and others to achieve an affective state 
of confidence and assurance.  Such an ascesis is most clearly spelled out in the strategy docu-
ment, Confident Communities in a Secure Britain: The Home Office Strategic Plan 2004-2008,93 which 
is further elaborated in the Together We Can Action Plan,94 and is articulated repeatedly as ‛our 
(the government’s) commitments to law-abiding citizens.‛  Amongst other things, ‛the respec-
table majority‛ is encouraged to make use of an array of ‛new‛ opportunities and arrangements 
for getting involved in community concerns by, for example, keeping themselves informed of, 
and getting involved in the steps taken by local agencies to address local cultures of disrespect; 
by taking a stand against anti-social behaviour by reporting incivilities; by regular updating to 
the ‛relevant authorities‛ of the impact of anti-social behaviour in neighbourhoods; and by 
helping to set local policing priorities and making suggestions for specific actions from local 
policing teams.  Through these governmental modalities, the ‛respectable majority‛ is thereby 
transformed into a variegated and fluid network of responsible authorities, and through this 
process is enabled to self-actualise (become-other) as a confident citizenry.  But what of ‛the mi-
nority,‛ those who lack respect and for whom a more authoritarian approach may be necessary?   
As Dean notes, authoritarian liberalism distinguishes between subjects according to their 
relative capacities for autonomy.95 Thus, as well as their difference from ‛the majority,‛ within 
‛the minority‛ are those ‛who can be profitably assisted in the exercise of their own freedom 
and those who must be coerced.‛96 In relation to the former, the Respect agenda holds that 
‛parenting is one of the most important responsibilities in creating a strong society based on 
mutual respect.‛97  Parenting technologies, therefore, constitute a key component for inculcating 
appropriate dispositions and aesthetic comportments.  It may be that individuals within ‛the 
minority‛ are capable of self-governance in some aspects of their lives – as consumers, as 
employees, as tenants, for example – but if, as parents, they ‛are unwilling, or unable to meet 
their responsibilities we (‛the majority‛) must ensure that they are challenged and supported to 
do so.‛98  Support comes by way of various ‛new‛ services, interventions and sources of 
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financial, social and cultural help for both parents and their children.  Challenge, on the other 
hand, renders support compulsory, enforced via a panoply of new and extended (out-of-court) 
summary powers of which the ASBO (Anti-Social Behaviour Order) is the most notorious.  At 
the level of ascesis, then, the operationalisation of liberal/illiberal modes of governance maps 
onto a dichotomised population wherein membership of ‛the majority‛/‛the minority‛ is 
determined by the presence/absence – and within this latter, the educability – of an aesthetics of 
respect.  In light of this, I want to suggest that the modalities and techniques of liberal/illiberal 
forms of government are mobilised through familiar ‛taxonomies of affect‛ or what I have 
termed, ‛emotionalities of rule.‛  In this paper, I have examined confidence and respect as 
‛emotionalities of rule,‛ as preferred and promoted sensibilities which are nurtured, en-
gendered and enfolded through specific governmental technologies and practices.  Of course, 
confidence and respect do not exhaust the emotionalities that circulate in governmental 
discourses; we can think, for example, of how tolerance, compassion, optimism and (even) 
happiness99 assume a special relevance and importance within liberalism – these are not merely 
personal dispositions but are expressive of a specific political and ethical relation.  Quite 
properly, then, we can speak of ‛emotionalities of rule‛ as arts of government through which we 
seek to govern and be governed in sentient, aesthetic and affective ways.   
 
4. Conclusion 
Analyses inspired by Foucauldian governmentality do not purport to apply theory to the 
empirical world, and thereby explain it.  Rather, the Foucauldian project suggests a number of 
conceptual tools for understanding how different forms of government are made thinkable and 
do-able, and how subjectivities are formed and transformed when autonomous individuals 
identify with a complex array of governmental technologies, strategies and expert authorities.  
However, and despite a rich and diverse ‛governmentality scholarship,‛ little attention has been 
paid to how desire, affect and sensate life is implicated in processes of subjectification; how 
passion can prompt (or not) an identification with governmental programmes; and how 
‛emotionalities of rule‛ propose and suggest ways of feeling about the world – how we should 
feel about ourselves and others, how we participate in, cultivate and enact an aesthetic life, and 
how we seek to govern and be governed in sentient, expressive ways.  The case study presented 
here demonstrates how questions of government, power and politics, morality and ethics can 
never be solely a matter of cognition and reason.  To assume that self-directing individuals 
identify with particular technologies and practices of the self on purely instrumental grounds is 
to deny the emotional and affective intensities which circulate, permeate and inform cognitive 
and discursive ways of being, doing and saying.  It is these intensities which confront and 
unsettle our ontological security, and which not only trouble our sense of social order and 
stability but also provoke a questioning of the work of government and its capacity to direct our 
own and others‛ conduct.  Moreover, such emotional ‛disturbances‛ are not reducible to a 
singular psychic state – melancholia, as psychoanalysis would have it – but are highly 
differentiated, complex and fluid such that they open up multiple ‛lines of flight‛ and initiate a 
plethora of alternative possibilities for the (re-)formation of un/governable subjectivities.  
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However, such moments of intensity may incite new identities and provoke ethical attachments 
that are inimical to particular regimes of rule such that they pose dangers for that regime, and 
problematise its modes and rationalities of governance.  In the case study, loss of confidence in 
the work of government, along with expressed feelings of distrust, disappointment, shock, 
outrage, confusion and fear, create the affective conditions for questioning the exercise of 
governmental power in a liberal, democratic society, and prompt the need to realign an 
uncertain citizenry as confident, assured subjects – a process which I have described as the 
‛enfolding of emotionalities.‛  There is much to be learned from an account that places affective 
agency at the heart of an analytics of government.   First, it alerts us to the way in which modes 
of obligation within liberalism involve obligations not only to legal and moral codes, but also to 
normative sensibilities, particular ways of feeling which are deemed appropriate to sustain 
political and ethical life in a liberal society – for example, tolerance, confidence, compassion, 
trust, optimism.  Secondly, it suggests that participation in and full membership of civil society 
relies as much on an affective identity as it does on any other kind of selfhood, as a ‛rational 
actor,‛ for example.  Thirdly, and following this last point, an account which centres on affective 
life emphasises how politico-ethical credentials are demonstrated and established not solely by a 
capacity to be a self-enterprising or self-sufficient individual, but also relies on expressive 
capabilities and the display of certain aesthetic qualities.  Finally, while the co-existence and 
intersection of sovereign, disciplinary and governmental power has been widely recognised, 
very little attention has been paid to the way in which taxonomies of affect underwrite the 
deployment of liberal/illiberal modes of governance across constituencies differentiated by 
ontologies of feeling.  Governing through subjectivities of affect is, then, an integral strategy of 
governance and is indispensable to the notion of governing through freedom.    
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